Family Business in Philippine Politics?: The Chicken-or-Egg Dilemma of Political Dynasties & Poverty

“Aba! Ginawa ba namang family business ang public service!” This sentiment is among the countless other prevalent rhetoric on political dynasties, which have been the subject of much castigation, disdain, and critical public discourse in the Philippines. Nonetheless, the reality of having pairs of siblings in the highest legislative body in the country, first-degree ties of representatives in the lower house, and the much graver picture of dominating political families in local governments are truths we cannot escape. It is still an enigma for me as to how I should perceive these dynasties as a student in political science. Most especially when some scholars establish a correlation, or in other cases, causation, of poverty and underdevelopment due to the emergence of political dynasties, it presents a great deal of analytical and scientifically rigorous challenge to arrive at an answer. As we endeavor to shed light on the implications of having multiple family members in different elected positions in the government, let us delve first into a contextual probe of their formation and then lay out firm arguments on both sides of the coin as to whether political dynasties have indeed worsened the rate of poverty and underdevelopment in the Philippines.

We start with a reality posited by McCoy (1993) that the actual development trajectory in the Philippines originated from the economic and political activities of the most influential families, which have been amassing capital over multiple generations. The nation's oligarchy integrates political influence and financial resources to shape the country's future. This harrowing picture made me feel so minuscule amid the competing hegemonic powers in the country. It made me question whether we have the capacity to direct the course of our lives, given that the future of our nation seems to be at the tip of the fingers of these influential Filipino families. However, how has it come this way? McCoy (2009) established two key elements of their formation, one of which is the deliberate pursuit to secure political influence to obtain a competitive edge in the market, an act called rent-seeking. These stringent state licenses enable holders to establish a monopoly or oligopoly within a specific market, reinforcing the positions of privileged families at the cost of economic advancement and government revenues. 

Furthermore, the rise of the autonomous Philippine Republic presents challenges as a problematic entity in the postcolonial context. In the early twentieth century, influential oligarchs established dominance while U.S. colonial administrators prioritized organizing elections over establishing a resilient national bureaucracy, as Aspinall et al. (2022) noted. The political landscape was fundamentally shaped by provincial machines, spearheaded by influential local families, establishing a linkage that extended upward to national legislative positions, primarily occupied by politicians belonging to these influential families. Against this backdrop, weak political parties and dynasties emerged within the nation. The state continued to exhibit an inability to regulate influential families engaging in asset plunder, governing provinces, and vying for dominance in national politics. Alarmingly, we are deeply embedded in their game of political eminence. Due to a myriad of historical contexts and pervasive rent-seeking, they succeeded in securing kickbacks from the executive that compromised the insulation of the regulatory bureaucracy.

The arguments on the causality of political dynasties toward aggravating the poverty rate and underdevelopment in the Philippines were put forward during a debate that we have engaged with in class. Some asserted that the negative impacts of political dynasties outweigh the positives that may be witnessed currently in Philippine politics. Dean Ronald Mendoza, the dean of the Ateneo School of Government at Ateneo de Manila University who spoke on the anti-political dynasty bill, posited that when aggregating the impacts of both positive and negative dynastic influences, the overall outcome tends to be characterized by underdevelopment and poverty. Its detrimental consequences outweigh the negligible positive effects. The most severe impacts are evident in locations marked by a fat dynasty, particularly when family members concurrently hold various positions. Thus, he signified that the fat dynasty variable is a significant predictor of poverty. Their governance has deviated from democratic principles and has transitioned into a state of impunity. As there is a concentration of power and monopoly in decision-making, it blocks the representation of other sectors, and alternative ideas would be curtailed. There would be no plurality in politics, which ensures vibrant democratic avenues for civil society. 

Where do these realities lead us? The political landscape of the Philippines evolved into a static equilibrium marked by a deeply rooted oligarchy and an impoverished populace, frequently swayed by the allure of inexpensive vote buying. It robs us of a clear means to move forward as political dynasties refrain from implementing reforms to alleviate poverty to maintain their grip on power. Instead, they provide handouts, offering immediate but temporary relief to their constituents without ensuring sustainability. Moreover, the disproportionate concentration of power and resources within specific families hinders other aspiring Filipinos from enjoying equal opportunities to engage in politics. Leaders with sincere intentions face formidable challenges these dynasties pose, compounded by the absence of a robust political party system that impedes the instillation of reforms. With all of these verities, ordinary Filipinos could almost feel the shackles in their hands that obstruct them from making the changes necessary for a thriving democracy that responds to the needs of the masses.

Nonetheless, are these the end-all-be-all of the analysis of the causation between political dynasties and poverty? The debate on this topic unveiled more nuances to this relationship, as multiple factors, such as colonial legacies and economic history, contribute to these present-day problems. One speaker noted the necessity of a bolder perspective on the issue of poverty beyond the scope of political dynasties, as their existence predates the Philippine republic itself, as what was established in the earlier part of this paper. The systematic failures are due to the institutions, inadequate systems, and lack of social programs, all public administration problems. Moreover, we cannot deny that these political dynasties localized development in their respective regions, where they are a unifying force for domestic businesses. They have been sustained due to their consistency and ability to fund significant projects in their localities. However, do these gains outweigh the gravity of the problem brought by diminished accountability and checks and balances in the government in political dynasties? Undeniably, the imperative to address this knowledge gap in political science is crucial for the advancement of Philippine society.

To cap off this paper, it is essential to note that the causation between political dynasties and poverty has not been established yet, as there is solely an association or correlation between the two, such as how studies indicate that provinces with an increased prevalence of family members in elected positions tend to exhibit higher levels of poverty and underdevelopment. Now, we have to work around the reality that befell our hands, which is the transformative potential of modernizing elites to harness their political and economic power for the common good. They are crucial to the whole democratic process; thus, we can combine the thin dynasties, which are solely consecutive and not simultaneously in office, with those who are non-dynasties, which now constitute more than half of the Congress. We can then inculcate a reform in the system bit by bit with this plausible objective. 

References:

Aspinall, E., Weiss, M., Hicken, A., & Hutchcroft, P. (2022). Mobilizing for Elections: Patronage and Political Machines in Southeast Asia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009075015 

McCoy, A. W. (Ed.). (2009). An anarchy of families: State and family in the Philippines. Univ of Wisconsin Press.